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Momentum in the UK Stock Market 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the presence of abnormal returns through the use 
of trading strategies that exploit the predictability of short run stock price 
movements. Based on historical returns of the largest set of individual 
securities in the UK stock market examined to date, this paper identifies 
profitable momentum trading strategies as investment tools over the 
period 1955-96. Our results show that returns on trading strategies 
cannot be accounted for by a simple adjustment for beta-risk.  Also, 
although we find some evidence of a size effect in the UK stock market, 
this phenomenon cannot explain the momentum profits. The paper finds 
that these profitable investment strategies are apparent in the sub-sample 
1977-96, in line with Liu, Strong and Xu (1999). However, they are not 
present in the earlier 1955-76 period. The implication is that momentum is 
not a general feature of the UK stock market, but is only apparent over 
certain time periods. 
 
 
JEL Classification: G14 
Keywords: Momentum, Contrarian strategies 
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1. Introduction 
Recently there has been much work on the profitability of trading strategies in stock 
markets. This work stands in stark contrast to the previously well-accepted doctrine of the 
efficient markets hypothesis. Under the null hypothesis of weak-form market efficiency, the 
performance of portfolios of stocks should be independent of past returns. However 
empirical research has shown that asset returns tend to exhibit some form of positive 
autocorrelation in the short to medium term; but mean-revert over longer horizons. There are 
two prevalent types of trading methodologies used to take advantage of serial correlation in 
stock price returns: momentum trading and contrarian strategies. Momentum strategies are 
at one end of the spectrum, and rely on short-run positive autocorrelation in returns. They 
generate abnormal profits by following a rule of buying past winners and selling past losers. 
Liu et al (1999) reports on the profitability of momentum strategies in the UK over the 
period 1977-96. In contrast contrarian strategies are based on negative serial correlation in 
stock prices such that selling winners and buying losers generates abnormal profits. 
 
The current paper assesses the profitability of momentum strategies on the UK stock 
market using the most comprehensive set of data available to date. This is important since 
any rejection of the efficient markets hypothesis may be a consequence of a short span of 
data, and raises the question as to whether the documented rejection of the efficient markets 
hypothesis is a property of the sample or whether it is a genuine empirical regularity. In fact 
Liu et al (1999) argue that their momentum results are robust across two sub-samples in 
their dataset. However we find that extending the data on UK returns back to 1955, the 
momentum effects apparent from 1977 onwards do not exist in the earlier period 1955-76. 
The next section presents an overview of the empirical literature on serial correlation in stock 
prices.  Section 3 describes the methodology and dataset used in the current paper, Section 
4 covers the potential problems and safeguards applied, and Section 5 presents the 
empirical results. Sections 6 and 7 report on the empirical findings after controlling for risk 
and size respectively, and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In recent years, there has been a surge of articles on the predictability of asset returns based 
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on historical data. DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) identified long run return reversals, 
which suggest that contrarian strategies of selling past winners and buying past losers 
generate abnormal returns.2 Other papers (Fama and French, 1988, Lo and MacKinlay, 
1988, Porterba and Summers, 1988, and Jegadeesh, 1990) have also found evidence of 
negative serial correlation in long horizon stock returns, but positive correlation at shorter 
intervals.3 Positive autocorrelation at short-time intervals implies that momentum strategies 
might yield profitable trading opportunities. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 1995) report 
significant positive returns when stocks are bought and sold based on short-run historical 
returns.  Firms with higher returns over the past 3- to 12- months subsequently outperform 
firms with lower returns over the same period.  Using data from the NYSE and stocks listed 
on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) from 1965 to 1989, they rank stocks in 
ascending order based on their past 3- to 12- month returns, and form ten equally weighted 
deciles of stock portfolios.  The top decile is classified as the ‘loser’ decile and the bottom 
decile as the ‘winner’ decile.  In each overlapping period, the strategy is then to buy the 
winner decile and sell the loser decile with holding periods of 3- to 12- months. Grinblatt 
and Titman (1989) document abnormal returns from following this trading strategy; 
however, the profits generated in the first year after portfolio formation dissipates in the 
following two years. Grundy and Martin (1998) use the Fama-French three factor risk-
adjusted returns model to record profitability of more than 1.3 percent per month using 
momentum strategies on NYSE and AMEX stocks over the period 1966 to 1995. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find strong momentum effect across industries: when 
stocks from past winning industries were bought and stocks from past losing industries sold, 
the strategy was highly profitable, even after controlling for cross-sectional dispersion in 
mean returns and likely microstructure differences. Conrad and Kaul (1998) in a study on 
                                                 
2 For the UK Power, Lonie and Lonie (1991), MacDonald and Power (1991), and Dissanaike (1997) find 
that contrarian strategies based on monthly returns of UK companies yield abnormal profits. However 
Clare and Thomas (1995) using randomly selected UK annual returns data over the period 1955 to 1990 
conclude that the documented overreaction was a manifestation of the small firm effect. 
3 These findings are contentious, and a number of arguments have been suggested that would reduce 
the profitability from exploiting these contrarian patterns: risk (Chan, 1988, Ball and Kothari, 1989, Fama 
and French, 1996), size effects (Zarowin, 1990), and microstructure effects (Kaul and Nimalendran, 1990, 
Lo and Mackinlay, 1990).  
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NYSE and AMEX securities between the period of 1926 to 1989 report the success of 
contrarian strategies at long horizons and momentum trading strategies at medium horizons. 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) found that momentum effects are distinct from 
post-earnings announcement drift. 
 
The momentum anomaly is not confined to the US. Rouwenhourst (1998) tests the 
profitability of momentum strategies in international equity markets.  Monthly total returns 
from 12 European countries during the period 1980 to 1995 were used to form relative 
strength portfolios.  After correcting for risk, it was found that winner portfolios outperform 
loser portfolios by more than 1 percent per month and the overall returns on all momentum 
portfolios are similar to the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for the US market. 
Using monthly returns from stock indices of 16 countries for the period of 1970 to 1995, 
Richards (1997) found that the momentum effect is strongest at the 6-month horizon with an 
annual excess return of 3.4 percent.  For horizons longer than one year, ranking period 
losers began to outperform winners with an average annualised excess returns of more than 
5.8 percent. Clare and Thomas (1995) and Dissanaike (1997) both find some evidence of 
momentum in the UK, though the focus of their work is on long-run over-reaction, rather 
than short-term momentum effects. Both studies use a sample of returns from securities on 
the LSPD database. Clare and Thomas (1995) using a random sample of stocks on the 
LSPD over the period 1955-1990 find weak evidence of momentum at the 12-month 
horizon, in that although winners outperform losers, the average return difference is 
insignificantly different from zero. They find that at the 24-month (and also at the 36-month) 
horizon there is significant evidence of over-reaction. Dissanaike (1997) using a sample of 
larger stocks that are constituents of the FT500 Index, over the period 1975-1991 find that 
there is some evidence of momentum (rather than reversal) up to the 24-month horizon. 
Hence the results at the 24-month horizon from the Clare and Thomas (1995) and 
Dissanaike (1997) are contradictory. A recent paper by Liu et al (1999) which focuses on 
short-run returns identifies the presence of momentum profits in UK stock returns over the 
period of January 1977 to December 1996.  Controlling for systematic risk, size, price, 
book-to-market ratio, or cash earnings-to-price ratio did not eliminate momentum profits.  
In addition they examine momentum profits in sub-samples of their dataset, and argue that 
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momentum effects are a robust feature of the UK equity market. 
 
In summary the evidence from above studies shows that over short to medium-term 
(i.e., 3- to 12- month) horizons, momentum strategies are most profitable; while contrarian 
strategies prove to be more profitable over the very short-term (i.e., 1- to 4- week) and 
long-term (i.e., 36- to 60- month) horizon.4 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
In this paper we test the null hypothesis of weak form stock market efficiency, by 
examining whether returns are independent over short time-horizons. Portfolios are formed 
on the basis of past returns, with the top batch of the ranked stocks labelled the ‘loser’ 
portfolio and the bottom the ‘winner’ portfolio. Momentum strategies form portfolios on the 
basis of past short-run returns, by buying winner portfolios and selling loser portfolios. The 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) predicts that these winner-loser portfolios will yield zero 
profits.  However if asset prices exhibit mean-reversion or overreaction, the winner-loser 
portfolios will generate profits over some horizons in the sample period. Our objective is to 
extend the time frame used by Liu et al (1999) to examine the claim that momentum effects 
are a robust feature of the UK equity market. 
 
The test for the profitability of momentum trading strategies in the paper is based on 
the methodology used by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993)5. These papers assess the profitability of  JxK trading strategies, where securities are 
assigned to portfolios according to a ranking in period t based on the previous J months' 
returns. In month t, we form a winner-loser portfolio, where an investor goes short on the 
loser portfolio and takes on a long position on the winner portfolio for the following K-
                                                 
4 While most of the empirical works point to some level of predictability in stock returns, there is 
disagreement about the underlying explanations. Alternative theoretical models of investor behaviour 
by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), DeLong et al. (1990), Baberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998), Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), Hong and Stein (1999), Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) have been 
proposed to explain these serial correlation properties in stock prices. 
5 This study will be based on log returns rather than raw returns.  Conrad and Kaul (1993) and Ball et al. 
(1995) point out that results documented by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), Chan (1988), Ball and 
Kothari (1989), and Chopra et al. (1992), suffer from measurement errors as raw returns were used in 
estimating portfolio performance. 
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month horizon.  Thus, based on J months of historical data, portfolios are held for a horizon 
of K months after being executed in month t.  
 
The data is taken from the London Share Price Database (LSPD) tape of returns of 
UK companies from January 1955 to December 1996. This tape consists of all companies 
quoted on the London Stock Exchange since 1975. For the period before 1975 the file is 
made up of a number of different samples. As well as a random sample of 33% of the 
companies quoted on the Exchange between 1955 and 1974, there are 33% of new issues 
in each year 1955-74. The tape also includes the 500 largest companies by market value in 
January 1955, and the 200 largest in December 1972, plus all 100 companies in the 
brewing industry. There are a total of 1,571 securities in the sample starting in January 1955, 
and as securities enter and leave the Exchange over the next 40 years, there are over 6,600 
securities in total over the entire sample period. 
 
Securities are selected based on their returns over the past 3 to 24 months.  Holding 
periods examined will also vary from 3 to 24 months. In fact there are 8 reported lags and 8 
horizons used in total (i.e., 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24-month intervals for every JxK 
strategy).  For every stock i on the LSPD tape without any missing values between test 
intervals, an equally weighted portfolio of losers and winners are formed based on 
cumulative monthly returns.  The procedure is repeated up to 64 times (i.e., once for each 
JxK trading strategy) using non-overlapping observations starting January 1955 to 
December 1996.   
 
The trading strategy consists of three basic steps.  First, individual stocks are ranked 
according to Cumulative Continuous Returns (CCR) for each stock i on past J months of 
continuously compounded monthly returns in the initial portfolio formation period.   
?
?
??
?
J
t
iti RCCR
1
 
where Rit is the log-return in month t for company i. 
  
Second, in each month t, the entire series of securities at that date is divided into ten 
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equal deciles in ascending order based on CCRis.  Securities are assigned in equal numbers 
to each of ten portfolios.  The top decile (decile 1) is designated the ‘loser’ portfolio and the 
bottom decile (decile 10) ‘winner’ portfolio.  In month t, we form a winner-loser portfolio 
whereby an investor goes short on the loser portfolio and takes on a long position on the 
winner portfolio. 
 
The third and final step of the trading rule is to determine the profits of a winner minus 
loser portfolio ( loserwinnerR ? ) where the mean monthly returns from past loser portfolios 
( loserR ) are subtracted from mean monthly returns of past winner portfolios ( winnerR ): 
 
loserwinnerR ?  = winnerR  - loserR  
 
The trading strategies are replicated for each stated period and the mean returns for 
each horizon is simply the average of all the replications. Under the null hypothesis of the 
EMH, the average returns on the winner-loser portfolio is zero.6    If the returns on these 
arbitrage portfolios ( loserwinnerR ? ) are significantly different from zero, we can reject the 
weak form of the EMH; assuming that transaction costs do not influence loserwinnerR ? . If 
there is evidence of momentum in the stock market, the winner-loser portfolios will generate 
significant abnormal profits. 
 
4. Potential Problems and Safeguards 
The investment horizons considered span between 3 months to 24 months.  As such, 
only the direct difference of winner-loser portfolio returns will be reported instead of 
abnormal returns for each portfolio.  This is because of the sensitivity of abnormal returns to 
the performance benchmark used over long horizons, as highlighted by Dimson and Marsh 
                                                 
6 The winner-loser portfolio test statistic is: 
loser
loser
winner
winner
loserwinner
NN
22 ??
??
?
?  
where ?winner is the mean monthly return on the winner portfolio, ?
2
winner the variance of the winner 
portfolio, Nwinner the number of observations in the winner portfolio, ? loser the mean monthly return on the 
loser portfolio, ? 2loser the variance of the winner portfolio, and Nloser the number of observations in the 
winner portfolio. 
 9
(1986).  Kothari and Warner (1997) also point out that tests for long-horizon abnormal 
returns around firm-specific events are severely misspecified.  In addition the methodology 
of carrying out a portfolio-to-portfolio comparison is conceptually akin to the control firm-
to-firm approach suggested by Barber and Lyon (1997) to help correct misspecified 
abnormal returns based test statistics. 
 
Since we use LSPD returns for this study, the monthly returns are computed from the last 
traded price in any month, and we acknowledge that the use of transactions prices 
potentially induces bid-ask bounce effects in our data, and problems of non-trading. Serial 
correlation can be induced by bid-ask spread effects when the last price of the ranking 
period is also the first price of the post-ranking period. To overcome the potential bid-ask 
bounce effects and seasonality effects, Liu et al (1999) used monthly returns computed from 
weekly Datastream price quotes for their empirical investigation. The Liu et al (1999) study 
uses data from 4,182 UK companies available from Datastream for the period January 
1977 to December 1996 with 3-month to 12-month test intervals.  In our tests we use a 
total of 6,600 securities from the LSPD tapes for the period January 1955 to December 
1996 with test intervals of 3-months to 24-months. In fact the bid-ask bounce effect is likely 
to overstate contrarian profits, but understate momentum returns. Since the bid-ask bounce 
effect is likely to be more pronounced for illiquid smaller companies, we investigate the role 
of firm size in the computation of momentum profits. 
 
In addition the UK equity market suffers from infrequent and non-synchronous trading. 
Clare, Morgan and Thomas (1997) and Morgan, Smith and Thomas (2000) examine the 
extent of non-synchronous trading in the UK, using the LSPD database, and report that it is 
a feature of the UK equity market. Clare et al (1997) point out that there were changes in 
the recording requirements relating to the marking of trades by the London Stock Exchange 
in March 1981. Prior to this date the marking of trades were less stringent, so that a 
significant number of trades were unreported on the LSPD database before April 1981.  
Morgan et al (2000) argue that non-synchronous trading will induce positive serial 
correlation in returns, so that we might expect that prior to April 1981, momentum effects 
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are more likely to be identified using LSPD data on the London Stock Exchange. 
 
Another issue is the importance of transaction costs.  Some of the trading strategies implied 
by our winner-loser portfolios can be transaction intensive, especially with overlapping test 
periods where up to an average of 300 transactions take place in a month.  Naturally, it is 
possible to modify the strategy to reduce the frequency of trading (i.e. by random selection 
of N percent of stocks from each decile or, by further dividing the top and bottom deciles 
into sub-deciles for investment purposes). In addition, stocks with smaller market 
capitalisation are more likely to be traded at a wider bid-ask spread compared to firms with 
larger market capitalisation. On the other hand institutional traders can often secure 
substantial trade discounts relative to individual retail investors. However, the aim of this 
paper is not to search for low transaction cost versions of trading strategies but rather, to 
identify stock price reversals and momentum in the UK market within a reasonable 
framework.  As such, portfolio profits in this study are made under non-specific transaction 
cost assumptions. 
 
The tests are performed on portfolio returns computed over non-overlapping time 
periods. The drawback of conducting such non-overlapping tests for long horizons is that 
first, there is an inevitable loss of information, and second, there is a chance that the 
economic cycle may be a major component in determining the outcome of contrarian and 
momentum strategies due to the limited data range.  However, Smith and Yadav (1996) 
conclude that for explanatory variables with serial correlation, General Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimators perform worse than non-overlapping regressions in producing low 
standard errors (i.e., generating empirical size probabilities above that of their respective 
theoretical values).  To test the robustness of the results, the data is truncated into two sub-
periods. 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
This section evaluates the profitability of momentum investment strategies described in 
the previous section.  The strategies were applied to all securities with non-missing returns 
listed on the London Stock Exchange between January 1955 and December 1996. 
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5.1. Non-Overlapping Observations (January 1955 to December 1996) 
Table I gives a detailed breakdown of returns based on non-overlapping 
observations from January 1955 to December 1996 with a J lag-holding period where the J 
lags range from 3-month to 24-months in three month intervals.  The table then reports 
profitability of each of the J strategies over the following K horizons where the K horizons 
also range from 3-month to 24-month. For each of the 64 strategies a total of eight summary 
statistics are shown: mean monthly returns, monthly standard deviations, and number of 
observations for both the loser portfolio and winner portfolios. Also the table shows the 
winner-loser portfolio mean monthly returns, and a test statistic for the significance of returns 
on the winner-loser portfolio (see footnote 5). 
 
<Table I> 
 
Most of the average returns for winner minus loser portfolios for the 64 strategies in 
Table I are positive and statistically significant. The results show a total of 24 trading 
strategies that are positive and statistically significant at the level of at least 90 percent.  The 
most profitable strategy is the 12 x 6 momentum strategy with a winner-loser portfolio that 
earns an annualised return of 16.2 percent.  This outcome is consistent with results for the 
overlapping test periods of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and non-overlapping test intervals 
by Liu et al (1999).  For multiple tests of the efficient markets hypothesis, the Bonferroni 
test is used to guard against the concern of k non-independent tests.  Even with an adjusted 
critical value at 3.29 the 12 x 6 strategy remains significant at a level of 99 percent.  In fact a 
total of 10 strategies remain significant at the new higher critical value. Note that the 3x3 
strategy actually yields significant negative returns implying that in the very short run, a 
contrarian strategy would be profitable. Also at the other end of the trading strategy range, 
for the 24-month ranking period none of the subsequent returns on the winner-loser 
portfolio are significantly different from zero, and in fact a number of returns are negative. 
This suggests that returns are negatively correlated over longer periods. Figure 1 graphs the 
returns for winner-loser portfolios across investment horizons for all 8 ranking periods. 
<Figure 1> 
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As can be seen from the figure, each of the strategies based on past returns exhibit a 
peak at around the 6 to 9-month holding period with subsequent returns tailing off to be 
insignificant, and even negative. We observe a pronounced upward drift in the returns as we 
progress from a 3-month up to a 12-month ranking period, such that the 12-month ranking 
period more-or-less dominates all other ranking periods in terms of subsequent investment 
returns. The downward drift of longer length ranking periods continues into the negative 
domain as the lagged past return periods are lengthened.  Of the 24 statistically significant 
trading strategies, most of them can be found between the 6-month to 12-month investment 
horizons based on 6-month to 15-month ranking periods.  All investment horizons for the 
winner-loser portfolio beyond 15-months yield insignificant profits.  Notice the returns seem 
to slip into the negative domain faster, as the ranking period increases.  This suggests that a 
momentum strategy is profitable in the short- to medium-time horizon but contrarian trading 
strategies are more profitable at very short intervals and over the long run when we observe 
a reversal in stock returns.       
 
5.2. Non-Overlapping Observations (January 1955 to December 1976) 
In Table II we report the returns of winner and loser portfolios from non-
overlapping observations for the first series of truncated data from January 1955 to 
December 1996 with a 3-month to 24-month lag-holding period. 
 
<Table II> 
 
 Results from this truncated series are very different from the full data set.  The 
returns on winner and loser portfolios in this sub-period are mostly positive but insignificant 
except for the 18x3 trading strategy where the winner-loser portfolio yields an average 
annualised return of 13.8 percent.   Apart from this strategy the only other statistically 
significant winner-loser portfolios was the 3x3 and 3x6 contrarian trading strategies which 
yielded an annualised profit of 14.04 percent.   
  
 <Figure 2> 
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 Figure 2 plots the holding period returns for each of the 8 strategies for the first sub-
period. In contrast to figure 1 it can be seen that the pattern of returns is much flatter, though 
again there is a tendency for negative returns for longer ranking periods, and longer holding 
periods. Only the 18x3 strategy breaks through the 0.005 per cent barrier, in contrast to 
figure 1 where 10 strategies did so. 
  
5.3. Non-Overlapping Observations (January 1977 to December 1996) 
Table III reports the returns for strategies based on non-overlapping observations 
for the second series of truncated data from January 1977 to December 1996. 
 
<Table III> 
 
 The results presented in Table III and plotted in figure 3 are notably different from 
those in Table II.  All profits from winner-loser strategies formed from a 3-month ranking 
period are positive and significant.  The 6-month to 18-month strategies yield positive 
returns over all return horizons and up to a 12-month horizon are typically significant. There 
is a downward drift to returns on the winner-loser portfolio as the investment horizon 
increases, but it is only for the 21-month and 24-month ranking period strategies that there 
are any negative returns, and only at long investment horizons. The evidence on profitable 
very short-term contrarian strategies has also disappeared. Almost half of the strategies yield 
significant positive returns, and break though the 0.005 barrier. The 18x3 strategy is the 
most profitable yielding an average annualised return of 23.6 percent, though this is a little 
anomalous. A more general pattern seems to be that returns increase at short investment 
horizons as we move from the 3-month up to the 9-month ranking periods, and thereafter 
start to fall off, though still yielding positive and significant returns. The evidence in this table 
is most closely comparable with the results in Liu et al (1999). 
 
<Figure 3> 
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6.  Empirical Findings After Controlling for Risk 
We expect riskier investments generally to yield higher returns than less risky 
investments, so that the results from the previous section, which have shown that returns on 
winner portfolios dominate returns on loser portfolios may be because the securities in the 
winner portfolio are riskier.  We now use the Capital Asset Pricing Model  (CAPM) to 
quantify of the trade-off between risk and expected return.   
 
With the market portfolio as exogenous and conditional on the realised return of 
individual assets, the CAPM model offers a testable prediction of betas.  Thus, to investigate 
whether a time varying beta explains the phenomenon observed, the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimator of the slope coefficient in the market model is used to estimate the 
respective portfolio betas7 : 
 
Rit = ? i + ? imRmt + eit 
 
where Rit is the realised of portfolio i at time t, Rmt is the realised return of the market 
portfolio8 at time t and eit is the zero mean disturbance term.  We use this regression method 
to obtain the beta of each of the respective decile portfolios. Rather than report the results 
for all 64 trading strategies, we concentrate on the symmetric strategies 3x3, 6x6 etc. The t-
statistics in the table are based on the null hypothesis of a beta of unity for the market 
portfolio. 
 
<Table IV>  
<Figure 4> 
 
 Table IV shows that portfolio betas of extreme portfolios (both winner and loser) 
are higher across the board for all trading strategies: the t-statistic however, show that the 
mid-range betas are more significantly different from unity than compared to those of 
                                                 
7 This is based on the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model (CAPM) excess-return market model: 
(Rit - Rf)  = ? im + ? im(Rmt - Rf) + eit.  The intercept term ? i is transposed as [? im - Rf(? im – 1)] instead of the 
prevalent Jensen performance index. 
8 We use the mean equally-weighted returns of all securities listed on the London Stock Exchange as a 
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extreme winner and loser deciles.  There is a tendency for the betas of the loser portfolios to 
be slightly higher than the betas for the winner portfolios. In the final row of the table we 
report the results of a t-test on the difference in the betas of the winner and loser portfolios: 
the evidence that the betas of winner deciles are larger, and hence riskier, than those of loser 
deciles, is inconclusive. 
 
 We repeated the test on the values of the decile portfolio betas for each of the two 
sub-periods, but the results are not reported here. In summary the results from the first sub-
period, January 1955 to December 1976, were similar to the numbers  presented in Table 
IV: although the betas of the extreme portfolios peak across the board for all trading 
strategies, with a tendency for the winner portfolios to have slightly higher betas, this 
difference was statistically insignificant.  The results of the beta regressions for the second 
sub-period January 1977 to December 1996, indicated that the betas of the winner 
portfolios are less than the betas of the loser decile. Again though the differences were 
insignificant. 
 
 The above results demonstrate that returns on trading strategies cannot be 
accounted for by a simple adjustment for beta-risk, because the winner and loser portfolios 
have similar risk estimates.  
                                                                                                                                            
broad-based benchmark for the market portfolio. 
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7.  Empirical Findings After Controlling for Size 
 Market capitalisation is defined as the current share price multiplied by the number of 
common shares outstanding.  Banz (1981) was one of the first to note that firms with lower 
market capitalisation (small firms) tend have higher sample mean returns than large firms.  
DeBondt and Thaler (1987) argue that the winner-loser phenomena is primary not a size 
effect; however, their finding show that on average, winners are twice as large as losers.  
Zarowin (1990) also finds that losers are usually smaller than winners based on 3-year 
sample periods.  
 
 We examine the effect of size on returns by comparing the difference in market 
capitalisation between winners and loser portfolios. We concentrate on the second sub-
period of the full sample, since it was over this period that the momentum profits were most 
significant. As before, we rank all companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange since 
January 1977 based on their 3-month to 24-month historical returns.  As previously, stocks 
are then sorted into ten equally-weighted deciles in ascending order with decile 1 being the 
loser portfolio decile 10 being the winner portfolio. The unique company identification 
number of each company is then matched with the LSPD market capitalisation file to obtain 
the respective market values,9 and the market capitalisation of each decile is computed by 
averaging the market capitalisations of the securities in that decile portfolio.  To be included, 
a firm must have non-missing values in both the LSPD returns and market capitalisation files. 
All market capitalisation figures are adjusted back to 1977 values 
<Table V> 
<Figure 5> 
 
 Table V report the results obtained by using adjusted rates of market capitalisation for 
the period of January 1977 to December 1996.  It can be seen that the average size of a 
security in each decile rises as we move from the loser decile up to decile 7 or decile 8 
across horizon categories. However in the last two to three deciles, average market 
                                                 
9 Zarowin (1990) also perform tests on the effect of size on past period performance on returns.  His 
method ranks stocks based on size first before sorting them into loser and winner deciles within each 
size decile.  Our investigation on the other hand, involves the ranking of stocks by returns followed by 
the analysis of size for the individual winner and loser deciles.  We follow DeBondt and Thaler (1985) 
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capitalisation falls as we move to the winner decile.  The market capitalisation of loser 
portfolios is smaller than that of winner portfolios across the board. The result of a statistical 
test on the equality between these two groups is shown in parenthesis in the last row of 
Table V.  Our finding are similar to the evidence in Liu et al (1999) where market 
capitalisation peaks around the mid-range deciles with loser portfolios smaller in size than 
winner portfolios.  It is important to note that we can attribute the size effect to explain 
excess returns profits only if losers (winners) are consistently bigger (smaller) than winners 
(losers) in periods when they outperform each other.  In fact while it is true that losers have 
a tendency to be smaller than winners, only 3 out of 8 test periods are statistically significant 
when tested for equality between these groups.  Moreover, statistically significant 
momentum profits are only present in holding periods of 3 to 6 months.  Consequently, the 
difference in size between loser and winner portfolios cannot explain momentum profits, 
since we find that the average size of a firm in the winner portfolio is actually larger than the 
size of a firm in the loser portfolio.  So that although we find some evidence of a size effect in 
the UK stock market; nonetheless, this phenomenon can not explain the momentum profits 
in the winner-loser portfolio returns. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 This paper has tested the profitability of momentum trading strategies in the UK stock 
market.  It did so by examining profits generated by extreme decile portfolios formed on 
historical returns.  Overall, returns from winner minus loser portfolios are positive and 
significant over practically all investment horizons up to 24 months after the portfolio 
formation.  This is strong evidence of a momentum effect over the short- to medium-term 
horizons, where an investor takes a long position on the winner portfolio and sells the loser 
portfolio. Earlier work by Clare and Thomas (1995) and Dissanaike (1997) had produced 
contradictory findings on the importance of momentum effects in 24-month horizons. Our 
findings support the results of Dissanaike (1997) that positive serial correlation is a feature of 
the data up to 24-month horizons.  
 
 The defining feature of the random walk in stock prices is that successive changes 
                                                                                                                                            
and Zarowin (1990) in dropping a firm from the test sample once a missing return is detected.  
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are uncorrelated, and deviations from this characteristic imply that the market is not efficient. 
However when we split our sample into two sub-periods from 1955-76 and 1977-96, we 
found that although the momentum strategy was profitable over the latter period, there was 
little evidence of momentum profits in the earlier period. Hence the profitability of 
momentum strategies over the entire sample is due to the high profitability of strategies over 
the latter half of the sample. This is an important result, because it indicates that positive 
serial correlation in UK stock prices is not a general feature of the whole sample, but is only 
confined to sub-samples. One possible reason for this result could be due to the less volatile 
pre-1976 market as reported by earlier studies on random walk models for stock prices. 
Clare et al (1997) suggested that since non-synchronous trading was a problem prior to 
April 1981 on the London Stock Exchange, we might expect serial correlation in the earlier 
part of the sample. In fact our results report exactly the opposite finding: in the period 1955-
76 there is little evidence in momentum effects (positive serial correlation), while in the 
period 1977-1996 there is much stronger evidence of momentum. Hence to the extent that 
non-synchronous trading induces positive serial correlation we would have expected 
stronger momentum effects in the early period rather than the latter period. Hence non-
synchronous trading cannot be held responsible for the observed momentum effects. This 
conclusion is consistent with the findings of Morgan et al (2000) that "non-trading explains, 
at most, about one quarter of the autocorrelation in the returns of the smallest value portfolio 
in the UK" (page 14)  
 
 We have also investigated the notion that winner portfolios were riskier than loser 
portfolios, thus accounting for their superior returns.  Our results show that returns on 
trading strategies cannot be accounted for by a simple adjustment for beta-risk.  In addition 
although we find some evidence of a size effect in the UK stock market, this phenomenon 
can not explain the momentum profits. 
 
 In conclusion our results confirm the presence of momentum in the UK market over 
the period entire 1955-96. However unlike Liu et al (1999) who suggest that the 
momentum profits are a robust feature of sub-samples of the data, we note the strong caveat 
that most of these profits were generated over the second half of the sample. The implication 
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is that momentum was not a general feature of the UK stock market over the whole period. 
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Figure 2
MONTHLY RETURNS ON NON-OVERLAPPING PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES BY 
TIME HORIZON OVER FIRST SUB-PERIOD 
(JANUARY 1955 TO DECEMBER 1976)
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Holding Period (Months)
R
et
ur
ns
 (%
)
3-Month Winner-Loser
6-Month Winner-Loser
9-Month Winner-Loser
12-Month Winner-Loser
15-Month Winner-Loser
18-Month Winner-Loser
21-Month Winner-Loser
24-Month Winner-Loser
 3
 
Figure 3 
MONTHLY RETURNS ON NON-OVERLAPPING PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES BY 
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TABLE I 
MONTHLY RETURNS ON NON-OVERLAPPING PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES BY TIME HORIZON 
(JANUARY 1955 TO DECEMBER 1996) 
 
Stocks are sorted and ranked in ascending order based on their respective J-month lagged returns.  Stocks are further divided into ten equally weighted deciles.  The top decile 
is the ‘loser’ portfolio and the bottom decile ‘winner’ portfolio. In month t, the strategy goes short on the loser portfolio and long on the winner portfolio.  Thus, based on J-
months of historical data, portfolios are held on for period of K-months and executed in month t.  Buy-and-hold returns are computed for both the winner and loser portfolios. 
 
J-MONTH  PAST RETURNS K-MONTH HOLDING PERIOD 
 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
3 Loser Portfolio 0.010855 0.007095 0.005808 0.005659 0.006458 0.007177 0.007771 0.007809 
 Standard Deviation 0.16212 0.15551 0.15244 0.15321 0.15365 0.15178 0.14989 0.14919 
 Number of Observations 29578 28578 27604 26652 25812 24933 24179 22630 
 Winner Portfolio 0.006575 0.008734 0.009717 0.010512 0.010008 0.009659 0.009536 0.0098 
 Standard Deviation 0.13662 0.13434 0.13415 0.13473 0.13455 0.13585 0.13441 0.13394 
 Number of Observations 28530 27535 26732 26013 25321 24685 24055 22744 
 
Winner-Loser 
Portfolioa 
-0.00428 0.001639 0.003908 0.004853 0.00355 0.002482 0.001765 0.001991 
 Test Statisticb -3.44† 1.315 3.098† 3.792† 2.751† 1.897> 1.346 1.482 
6 Loser Portfolio 0.007999 0.004404 0.004231 0.004631 0.005644 0.006398 0.007139 0.007357 
 Standard Deviation 0.16862 0.16067 0.15652 0.15807 0.15625 0.1556 0.1534 0.15299 
 Number of Observations 14524 13906 13511 12952 12591 12064 11759 11269 
 Winner Portfolio 0.011329 0.011344 0.012305 0.011654 0.011088 0.010368 0.010556 0.010257 
 Standard Deviation 0.13375 0.13139 0.13458 0.13225 0.1336 0.1346 0.13307 0.13343 
 Number of Observations 14085 13523 13255 12805 12580 12183 11959 11539 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.003329 0.00694 0.008074 0.007023 0.005444 0.003969 0.003417 0.0029 
 Test Statistic 1.881> 3.917† 4.47† 3.854† 2.953† 2.12* 1.8> 1.531 
9 Loser Portfolio 0.004286 0.002706 0.003782 0.004303 0.004952 0.00654 0.006875 0.007325 
 Standard Deviation 0.17132 0.16205 0.15984 0.16169 0.16017 0.15657 0.1576 0.15312 
 Number of Observations 9316 9036 8755 8288 8089 7868 7501 7305 
 Winner Portfolio 0.010683 0.012223 0.012188 0.011753 0.010263 0.010224 0.01007 0.009415 
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J-MONTH  PAST RETURNS K-MONTH HOLDING PERIOD 
 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
 Standard Deviation 0.13202 0.12615 0.13029 0.13616 0.13446 0.13394 0.1367 0.13665 
 Number of Observations 9126 8925 8782 8421 8288 8150 7827 7683 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.006397 0.009518 0.008405 0.007449 0.00531 0.003683 0.003195 0.00209 
 Test Statistic 2.904† 4.4† 3.801† 3.238† 2.308† 1.598 1.358 0.886 
 12 Loser Portfolio 0.015929 0.001601 -4.8E-05 0.004617 0.007754 0.006158 0.005862 0.007992 
 Standard Deviation 0.16857 0.16431 0.15954 0.15626 0.15291 0.15493 0.15424 0.15241 
 Number of Observations 6889 6680 6459 6092 5915 5736 5595 5299 
 Winner Portfolio 0.024624 0.01418 0.009957 0.011893 0.013213 0.010556 0.009071 0.009881 
 Standard Deviation 0.12651 0.12545 0.13155 0.12923 0.12903 0.13167 0.13244 0.12979 
 Number of Observations 6797 6632 6515 6222 6115 6000 5906 5629 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.008695 0.012579 0.010005 0.007276 0.005459 0.004399 0.00321 0.001889 
 Test Statistic 3.447† 5.005† 3.864† 2.767† 2.068† 1.649> 1.201 0.701 
15 Loser Portfolio -0.00211 -0.00158 0.001334 0.002872 0.006297 0.005721 0.006396 0.007108 
 Standard Deviation 0.18065 0.16586 0.16201 0.16429 0.16225 0.15777 0.15347 0.15145 
 Number of Observations 5520 5155 4995 4842 4694 4562 4297 4166 
 Winner Portfolio 0.004555 0.004876 0.007215 0.008756 0.009888 0.00847 0.00738 0.007387 
 Standard Deviation 0.13399 0.13492 0.13263 0.13654 0.13452 0.13307 0.13156 0.13084 
 Number of Observations 5471 5186 5115 5031 4937 4843 4575 4500 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.006665 0.006452 0.00588 0.005884 0.00359 0.002749 0.000983 0.000279 
 Test Statistic 2.314* 2.194* 1.995* 1.953> 1.196 0.92 0.325 0.092 
18 Loser Portfolio 0.00947 0.008257 0.009997 0.008203 0.007521 0.00831 0.009295 0.009741 
 Standard Deviation 0.16901 0.1584 0.1547 0.16074 0.158 0.15863 0.15597 0.14972 
 Number of Observations 4389 4256 4108 3830 3736 3640 3532 3414 
 Winner Portfolio 0.016939 0.01423 0.014068 0.012544 0.010091 0.009073 0.009121 0.008926 
 Standard Deviation 0.12484 0.11835 0.12715 0.13039 0.13392 0.13391 0.13641 0.13507 
 Number of Observations 4359 4272 4219 3956 3910 3838 3778 3712 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.00747 0.005973 0.004071 0.004341 0.00257 0.000763 -0.00017 -0.00081 
 Test Statistic 2.383* 1.94> 1.278 1.312 0.769 0.228 -0.05 -0.24 
21 Loser Portfolio 0.003773 0.00125 0.00132 0.006628 0.007861 0.007594 0.009102 0.009404 
 Standard Deviation 0.1703 0.16487 0.16376 0.16748 0.1526 0.15212 0.14737 0.14426 
 Number of Observations 3679 3575 3452 3189 3093 3000 2907 2828 
 Winner Portfolio 0.011318 0.008125 0.006803 0.011126 0.009774 0.008452 0.009213 0.008749 
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J-MONTH  PAST RETURNS K-MONTH HOLDING PERIOD 
 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
 Standard Deviation 0.11076 0.12163 0.12493 0.12598 0.12261 0.13063 0.13036 0.13037 
 Number of Observations 3677 3605 3539 3307 3251 3193 3135 3089 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.007545 0.006875 0.005483 0.004498 0.001913 0.000858 0.000111 -0.00065 
 Test Statistic 2.293* 2.031* 1.591 1.263 0.541 0.236 0.031 -0.18 
          
24 Loser Portfolio 0.036526 0.015561 0.013223 0.015504 0.013819 0.010867 0.008803 0.01051 
 Standard Deviation 0.17083 0.16335 0.15552 0.16025 0.15912 0.15671 0.15904 0.15449 
 Number of Observations 3219 3109 3014 2771 2689 2608 2539 2456 
 Winner Portfolio 0.035315 0.020914 0.016328 0.015762 0.013609 0.010241 0.007961 0.008804 
 Standard Deviation 0.11703 0.12311 0.12224 0.12176 0.12884 0.13101 0.135 0.13429 
 Number of Observations 3222 3168 3109 2879 2831 2777 2745 2706 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio -0.00121 0.005353 0.003105 0.000258 -0.00021 -0.00063 -0.00084 -0.00171 
 Test Statistic -0.34 1.474 0.851 0.068 -0.05 -0.16 -0.21 -0.43 
          
a The trading strategies are replicated for each stated period and the mean returns shown for each horizon is the log normal average of all non-overlapping replications. 
† Significant at the 99% level * Significant at the 95% level       > Significant at the 90% level. 
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TABLE II 
MONTHLY RETURNS ON NON-OVERLAPPING PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES BY TIME HORIZON 
OVER FIRST SUB-PERIOD (JANUARY 1955 TO DECEMBER 1976) 
 
Stocks are sorted and ranked in ascending order based on their respective J-month lagged returns.  Stocks are further divided into ten equally weighted deciles.  The top decile 
is the ‘loser’ portfolio and the bottom decile ‘winner’ portfolio. In month t, the strategy goes short on the loser portfolio and long on the winner portfolio.  Thus, based on J-
months of historical data, portfolios are held on for period of K-months and executed in month t.  Buy-and-hold returns are computed for both the winner and loser portfolios. 
 
J-MONTH  PAST 
RETURNS 
K-MONTH HOLDING PERIOD 
 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
3 Loser Portfolio 0.014643 0.010182 0.008505 0.007209 0.007106 0.007218 0.007472 0.007368 
 Standard Deviation 0.1385 0.13228 0.1282 0.12969 0.13028 0.12827 0.12765 0.12582 
 Number of Observations 12842 12412 11971 11517 11091 10657 10271 9962 
 Winner Portfolio 0.002937 0.005646 0.006986 0.008188 0.007819 0.00764 0.007546 0.007577 
 Standard Deviation 0.1291 0.12567 0.12418 0.12604 0.12538 0.1243 0.12542 0.12376 
 Number of Observations 12357 11841 11407 11012 10621 10234 9851 9523 
 Winner-Loser Portfolioa -0.01171 -0.00454 -0.00152 0.000979 0.000713 0.000422 7.46E-05 0.000208 
 Test Statisticb -6.94† -2.74† -0.92 0.575 0.411 0.242 0.042 0.116 
6 Loser Portfolio 0.011165 0.00891 0.006768 0.005532 0.006003 0.005837 0.006576 0.006194 
 Standard Deviation 0.14438 0.13424 0.13469 0.13362 0.13485 0.13204 0.13276 0.12922 
 Number of Observations 6333 6000 5886 5552 5446 5132 5048 4812 
 Winner Portfolio 0.008189 0.007967 0.009195 0.009263 0.009213 0.008077 0.008137 0.007436 
 Standard Deviation 0.13063 0.12084 0.12827 0.12585 0.12606 0.12671 0.1266 0.12677 
 Number of Observations 6082 5725 5633 5312 5242 4918 4842 4620 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio -0.00298 -0.00094 0.002427 0.003732 0.00321 0.00224 0.001561 0.001242 
 Test Statistic -1.2 -0.4 0.99 1.499 1.272 0.868 0.599 0.471 
9 Loser Portfolio -0.00142 0.004138 0.00511 0.002353 0.00463 0.006079 0.005329 0.006327 
 Standard Deviation 0.14765 0.13269 0.13349 0.13781 0.13345 0.12873 0.1329 0.12747 
 Number of Observations 3973 3897 3815 3514 3459 3404 3224 3166 
 Winner Portfolio 0.000559 0.007175 0.007864 0.007691 0.007602 0.00773 0.006414 0.006555 
 Standard Deviation 0.1268 0.12402 0.1273 0.13483 0.12962 0.12537 0.1368 0.13573 
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J-MONTH  PAST 
RETURNS 
K-MONTH HOLDING PERIOD 
 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
 Number of Observations 3842 3774 3726 3431 3376 3325 3118 3059 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.001976 0.003037 0.002754 0.005339 0.002972 0.001651 0.001085 0.000228 
 Test Statistic 0.635 1.036 0.917 1.632 0.934 0.533 0.32 0.068 
12 Loser Portfolio 0.013993 0.003012 0.001836 0.004769 0.007176 0.005729 0.005723 0.006792 
 Standard Deviation 0.14815 0.13698 0.14035 0.13554 0.13454 0.13247 0.13524 0.12927 
 Number of Observations 2947 2884 2817 2561 2506 2457 2414 2238 
 Winner Portfolio 0.018436 0.007285 0.005512 0.009642 0.010564 0.006951 0.005884 0.006784 
 Standard Deviation 0.12421 0.11654 0.12648 0.12741 0.12606 0.12607 0.12992 0.12768 
 Number of Observations 2870 2805 2769 2484 2440 2404 2373 2191 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.004443 0.004273 0.003676 0.004873 0.003388 0.001222 0.000162 -7.7E-06 
 Test Statistic 1.241 1.268 1.029 1.316 0.914 0.329 0.042 -0 
15 Loser Portfolio 0.004338 -0.00467 0.000738 0.003399 0.006676 0.005864 0.00416 0.004803 
 Standard Deviation 0.15841 0.14396 0.14426 0.14983 0.14145 0.13275 0.13053 0.12566 
 Number of Observations 2416 2354 2091 2049 2015 1985 1947 1780 
 Winner Portfolio 0.000512 -0.00349 0.004428 0.006658 0.007838 0.006075 0.003379 0.003764 
 Standard Deviation 0.13103 0.12944 0.13194 0.14442 0.13431 0.12808 0.13063 0.13162 
 Number of Observations 2364 2321 2057 2025 1987 1946 1912 1752 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio -0.00383 0.001183 0.00369 0.003259 0.001163 0.000211 -0.00078 -0.00104 
 Test Statistic -0.91 0.296 0.86 0.707 0.267 0.051 -0.19 -0.24 
18 Loser Portfolio 0.003952 0.011908 0.0129 0.006823 0.007173 0.008132 0.008749 0.010207 
 Standard Deviation 0.14765 0.12899 0.12692 0.12756 0.12729 0.12673 0.13422 0.12836 
 Number of Observations 1873 1831 1791 1632 1606 1584 1554 1520 
 Winner Portfolio 0.01483 0.013526 0.012751 0.01 0.008624 0.007514 0.007371 0.008138 
 Standard Deviation 0.121 0.11614 0.12556 0.12708 0.12835 0.12922 0.13917 0.13509 
 Number of Observations 1834 1797 1777 1599 1581 1558 1529 1497 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.010878 0.001619 -0.00015 0.003177 0.001451 -0.00062 -0.00138 -0.00207 
 Test Statistic 2.456* 0.397 -0.04 0.709 0.32 -0.14 -0.28 -0.43 
21 Loser Portfolio 0.004556 0.000736 0.002287 0.007783 0.007954 0.008995 0.009889 0.009999 
 Standard Deviation 0.14225 0.14526 0.13243 0.12062 0.12868 0.13178 0.12964 0.12202 
 Number of Observations 1561 1526 1492 1336 1309 1281 1252 1229 
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J-MONTH  PAST 
RETURNS 
K-MONTH HOLDING PERIOD 
 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
 Winner Portfolio 0.007799 0.003722 0.005063 0.011461 0.00925 0.007912 0.007544 0.007211 
 Standard Deviation 0.11185 0.12758 0.1285 0.11986 0.12735 0.13499 0.13321 0.13339 
 Number of Observations 1538 1503 1479 1305 1284 1262 1238 1219 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.003244 0.002986 0.002776 0.003677 0.001296 -0.00108 -0.00235 -0.00279 
 Test Statistic 0.706 0.601 0.58 0.786 0.258 -0.2 -0.45 -0.54 
24 Loser Portfolio 0.027714 0.01057 0.014079 0.013923 0.013087 0.011503 0.008787 0.008498 
 Standard Deviation 0.15381 0.12816 0.13456 0.1407 0.1449 0.13786 0.13689 0.1226 
 Number of Observations 1267 1235 1212 1185 1155 1129 1107 953 
 Winner Portfolio 0.027649 0.011678 0.014706 0.014239 0.012342 0.008295 0.005425 0.006207 
 Standard Deviation 0.11817 0.11825 0.12115 0.12686 0.13537 0.13698 0.13869 0.13841 
 Number of Observations 1248 1229 1213 1186 1164 1146 1133 986 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio -6.4E-05 0.001107 0.000627 0.000316 -0.00074 -0.00321 -0.00336 -0.00229 
 Test Statistic -0.01 0.223 0.121 0.057 -0.13 -0.56 -0.58 -0.39 
a The trading strategies are replicated for each stated period and the mean returns shown for each horizon is the log normal average of all non-overlapping replications. 
† Significant at the 99% level * Significant at the 95% level  
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TABLE III 
MONTHLY RETURNS ON NON-OVERLAPPING PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES BY TIME HORIZON 
SECOND SUB-PERIOD (JANUARY 1977 TO DECEMBER 1996) 
 
Stocks are sorted and ranked in ascending order based on their respective J-month lagged returns.  Stocks are further divided into ten equally weighted deciles.  The top decile 
is the ‘loser’ portfolio and the bottom decile ‘winner’ portfolio. In month t, the strategy goes short on the loser portfolio and long on the winner portfolio.  Thus, based on J-
months of historical data, portfolios are held on for period of K-months and executed in month t.  Buy-and-hold returns are computed for both the winner and loser portfolios. 
 
J-MONTH  PAST 
RETURNS 
K-MONTH HOLDING PERIOD 
 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
3 Loser Portfolio 0.004213 0.002611 0.002888 0.002881 0.004192 0.004822 0.005588 0.005576 
 Standard Deviation 0.17542 0.172 0.16878 0.16851 0.16847 0.1675 0.1651 0.16415 
 Number of Observations 15641 14897 14198 13536 12881 12302 11767 11267 
 Winner Portfolio 0.011028 0.011142 0.011429 0.011711 0.010814 0.009993 0.009442 0.009566 
 Standard Deviation 0.13951 0.14043 0.13976 0.14091 0.1417 0.14231 0.14147 0.14135 
 Number of Observations 15151 14482 13918 13395 12917 12506 12082 11685 
 Winner-Loser Portfolioa 0.006815 0.008531 0.008542 0.00883 0.006623 0.00517 0.003855 0.00399 
 Test Statisticb 3.779† 4.662† 4.626† 4.667† 3.416† 2.618† 1.934> 1.97* 
6 Loser Portfolio 0.006795 0.001014 0.002766 0.002506 0.00477 0.004621 0.005859 0.005567 
 Standard Deviation 0.18196 0.17325 0.1722 0.16848 0.17096 0.16839 0.16906 0.16534 
 Number of Observations 7541 7266 6819 6578 6181 5972 5635 5441 
 Winner Portfolio 0.01905 0.013494 0.015628 0.013648 0.012974 0.010765 0.011536 0.010519 
 Standard Deviation 0.13196 0.13474 0.13834 0.13415 0.13773 0.13856 0.13929 0.13738 
 Number of Observations 7375 7174 6811 6670 6369 6268 5992 5861 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.012255 0.01248 0.012862 0.011142 0.008204 0.006144 0.005677 0.004952 
 Test Statistic 4.716† 4.835† 4.807† 4.207† 2.955† 2.198* 1.969* 1.725> 
9 Loser Portfolio -0.0031 -0.00115 0.001787 0.001251 0.003879 0.004761 0.004621 0.005563 
 Standard Deviation 0.19193 0.176 0.1777 0.17995 0.17125 0.17056 0.17181 0.16722 
 Number of Observations 4933 4750 4396 4224 4066 3756 3632 3516 
 Winner Portfolio 0.01263 0.014547 0.014575 0.01275 0.011304 0.010812 0.010032 0.00984 
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J-MONTH  PAST 
RETURNS 
K-MONTH HOLDING PERIOD 
 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
 Standard Deviation 0.12437 0.13451 0.13577 0.13705 0.13373 0.13474 0.13629 0.13475 
 Number of Observations 4877 4760 4450 4363 4293 4040 3972 3898 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.01573 0.015698 0.012788 0.011499 0.007425 0.006051 0.005411 0.004277 
 Test Statistic 4.823† 4.886† 3.8† 3.323† 2.201* 1.73> 1.512 1.204 
12 Loser Portfolio 0.019528 0.00979 0.004217 0.002136 0.006906 0.007535 0.00663 0.005395 
 Standard Deviation 0.1846 0.17573 0.17786 0.16864 0.17043 0.17028 0.17147 0.1653 
 Number of Observations 3534 3406 3271 3139 2864 2753 2657 2572 
 Winner Portfolio 0.032672 0.024734 0.017004 0.011318 0.014232 0.013038 0.010784 0.008995 
 Standard Deviation 0.1297 0.13058 0.13676 0.13055 0.13249 0.13286 0.13556 0.13262 
 Number of Observations 3510 3415 3335 3288 3056 3002 2960 2905 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.013144 0.014943 0.012787 0.009182 0.007326 0.005503 0.004154 0.0036 
 Test Statistic 3.46† 3.985† 3.271† 2.433* 1.838> 1.358 1.0 0.881 
15 Loser Portfolio 0.004848 0.006835 0.001968 0.002821 0.003567 0.005463 0.00673 0.006248 
 Standard Deviation 0.18412 0.17481 0.18286 0.16742 0.16613 0.17155 0.16637 0.17011 
 Number of Observations 2733 2627 2527 2420 2325 2090 2028 1968 
 Winner Portfolio 0.021999 0.020319 0.016075 0.012573 0.010402 0.010185 0.010245 0.009522 
 Standard Deviation 0.11186 0.1278 0.13335 0.12673 0.13166 0.13604 0.13518 0.14272 
 Number of Observations 2753 2696 2650 2607 2568 2367 2335 2299 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.017151 0.013484 0.014107 0.009752 0.006836 0.004721 0.003515 0.003274 
 Test Statistic 4.166† 3.206† 3.159† 2.315* 1.584 1.009 0.759 0.674 
18 Loser Portfolio -0.00419 -0.00387 -2.6E-05 -0.00044 0.004197 0.004953 0.00454 0.004003 
 Standard Deviation 0.19164 0.17884 0.1694 0.16687 0.17005 0.17084 0.17605 0.16597 
 Number of Observations 2327 2227 1968 1881 1807 1740 1694 1645 
 Winner Portfolio 0.013656 0.007928 0.011223 0.009312 0.010819 0.009197 0.008835 0.007672 
 Standard Deviation 0.12998 0.13804 0.13274 0.12883 0.13033 0.13326 0.13809 0.13442 
 Number of Observations 2345 2311 2077 2045 2015 1988 1960 1916 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.017849 0.011796 0.011249 0.009755 0.006623 0.004244 0.004295 0.003669 
 Test Statistic 3.723† 2.481* 2.342* 2.038* 1.34 0.837 0.811 0.717 
21 Loser Portfolio 0.022138 0.00375 0.004923 0.006689 0.006629 0.007344 0.007883 0.010989 
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J-MONTH  PAST 
RETURNS 
K-MONTH HOLDING PERIOD 
 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
 Standard Deviation 0.17979 0.17822 0.17724 0.17948 0.18106 0.18693 0.19307 0.1827 
 Number of Observations 1929 1867 1793 1569 1502 1450 1398 1359 
 Winner Portfolio 0.020061 0.011026 0.011533 0.010863 0.007566 0.006762 0.007648 0.008908 
 Standard Deviation 0.11133 0.13779 0.13549 0.1306 0.1314 0.1363 0.1371 0.13198 
 Number of Observations 1945 1909 1869 1672 1644 1623 1604 1581 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio -0.00208 0.007277 0.006609 0.004174 0.000937 -0.00058 -0.00023 -0.00208 
 Test Statistic -0.43 1.401 1.264 0.753 0.165 -0.1 -0.04 -0.35 
24 Loser Portfolio 0.041998 0.025748 0.021317 0.011708 0.011556 0.010508 0.00694 0.007534 
 Standard Deviation 0.18399 0.18498 0.17029 0.16859 0.17537 0.16702 0.17301 0.16672 
 Number of Observations 1556 1501 1443 1390 1351 1295 1244 1203 
 Winner Portfolio 0.045846 0.031251 0.022324 0.012167 0.012207 0.010478 0.007094 0.007173 
 Standard Deviation 0.11721 0.11992 0.12898 0.11942 0.12764 0.12416 0.13198 0.13113 
 Number of Observations 1569 1546 1522 1494 1474 1448 1426 1409 
 Winner-Loser Portfolio 0.003848 0.005503 0.001007 0.000459 0.000651 -3E-05 0.000154 -0.00036 
 Test Statistic 0.697 0.971 0.181 0.084 0.112 -0.01 0.026 -0.06 
a The trading strategies are replicated for each stated period and the mean returns shown for each horizon is the log normal average of all non-overlapping replications. 
† Significant at the 99% level * Significant at the 95% level > Significant at the 90% level 
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TABLE IV 
OLS PORTFOLIO REGRESSIONS OF TEST PERIOD RETURNS ON RANK PERIOD BETAS  
(JANUARY 1955 TO DECEMBER 1996) 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator of the slope coefficient in the market model is used to estimate the respective betas for non-overlapping test periods using data from 
January 1955 to December 1996:    Rit = ? im + ? imRmt + eit where Rit is the realised log return on portfolio
a i at time t, Rmt is the realised log return on market porfolio
b at time t and 
eit is the zero mean disturbance term.  We obtain the beta of the respective portfolios by regressing the return on the market porfolio on the mean return of portfolio i at time t. 
PORTFOLIO ?  INVESTMENT HORIZON 
 3 x 3 6 x 6 9 x 9 12 x 12 15 x 15 18 x 18 21 x 21 24 x 24 
Decile 1   1.176091c 1.208653 1.254213 1.193675 1.223593 1.277913 1.175794 1.240793 
 (2.195)d (1.863) (1.962) (1.210) (1.587) (1.170) (0.763) (1.328) 
Decile 2 0.999965 1.001493 1.043352 1.016221 1.021921 1.078817 1.001172 1.063785 
 -(0.001) (0.034) (0.925) (0.244) (0.437) (0.757) (0.016) (0.877) 
Decile 3 0.940137 0.938175 0.973212 0.957217 0.950305 0.98991 0.947399 0.985305 
 -(2.117) -(2.302) -(0.997) -(1.413) -(1.595) -(0.227) -(1.828) -(0.529) 
Decile 4 0.917579 0.913568 0.936796 0.933152 0.918518 0.942095 0.931281 0.942562 
 -(4.366) -(4.216) -(2.862) -(3.538) -(2.679) -(2.861) -(2.633) -(3.458) 
Decile 5 0.916266 0.909406 0.918353 0.92491 0.917793 0.916302 0.935497 0.922999 
 -(5.693) -(4.576) -(3.358) -(2.995) -(2.706) -(2.116) -(1.726) -(2.629) 
Decile 6 0.922992 0.9164 0.91243 0.927201 0.919953 0.909967 0.94464 0.91115 
 -(4.856) -(3.919) -(3.083) -(2.049) -(2.574) -(1.571) -(1.057) -(2.208) 
Decile 7 0.942888 0.934627 0.920046 0.932553 0.933659 0.920593 0.955298 0.918017 
 -(2.751) -(2.533) -(2.541) -(1.551) -(1.983) -(1.136) -(0.733) -(1.576) 
Decile 8 0.971089 0.9665 0.945709 0.958718 0.954159 0.933903 0.982389 0.942985 
 -(1.053) -(1.035) -(1.489) -(0.788) -(1.260) -(0.851) -(0.278) -(1.001) 
Decile 9 1.027154 1.017155 0.984969 1.017976 1.012939 0.966293 1.018469 0.994204 
 (0.721) (0.421) -(0.341) (0.306) (0.265) -(0.415) (0.297) -(0.100) 
Decile 10 1.185659 1.193482 1.110957 1.137798 1.145241 1.067488 1.108219 1.076219 
 (3.138) (2.875) (1.649) (2.583) (1.890) (0.909) (1.605) (1.662) 
D1 - D10 0.009568 -0.015171 -0.143256 -0.055877 -0.078352 -0.210425 -0.067575 -0.164574 
 (0.033)e -(0.041) -(0.422) -(0.127) -(0.185) -(0.752) -(0.186) -(0.354) 
 16
a To be included in each test period, a security must have non-missing returns both the ranking and holding period.  On each portfolio formation date, companies are sorted and ranked based on the holding period returns and allocated to 
one of the ten deciles; with the extreme top decile as the ‘loser’ portfolio and the extreme bottom decile as the ‘winner’ portfolio. 
b We use the mean equally-weighted returns of all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange with non-missing returns as a broad-based benchmark for the market porfolio. 
c Securities are ranked based on past returns and assigned in equal numbers to ten portfolios.  For each decile, a pooled regression over the returns was performed to estimate the beta for the respective portfolios. 
d Test statistic for null hypothesis of portfolio having a unity beta (i.e., market portfolio) using the Newey-West standard error. 
e Test statistic for null hypothesis of equality between betas of winner portfolio (decile 10) and loser portfolio (decile 1) using Newey-West standard errors. 
† Significant at the 95% level * Significant at the 95% level       > Significant at the 90% level. 
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TABLE V 
TEST PERIOD ADJUSTED^ MARKET CAPITALISATION* BASED ON HISTORICAL RETURNS  
(JANUARY 1977 TO DECEMBER 1996) 
 
Using yearly market capitalisation data from the LSPD tapes, we first rank all British registered companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange based on their historical returns on each 
portfolio formation date.  The stocks are further sorted into ten equally-weighted deciles in ascending order; that is, the top decile (decile 1) is the loser portfolio and the bottom decile (decile 10) 
is the winner portfolio.  The unique company identification number of each company is then matched with the LSPD market capitalisation file to obtain the  subsequent average market 
capitalisation for the following year for each decile portfolioa. 
PORTFOLIO HISTORICAL HORIZON 
 3 MONTHS 6 MONTHS 9 MONTHS 12 MONTHS 15 MONTHS 18 MONTHS 21 MONTHS 24 MONTHS 
DECILE 1 23.4123 24.87831 18.19055 21.06481 27.62423 20.14545 30.01112 25.41228 
         
DECILE 2 36.46783 32.45337 37.11601 33.18265 43.09243 48.26271 45.5545 57.8808 
         
DECILE 3 43.63281 42.06987 44.315 42.06309 52.54118 60.44807 66.82402 70.14192 
         
DECILE 4 47.96091 49.08309 52.03454 57.70418 65.95312 60.9877 70.39863 62.42256 
         
DECILE 5 54.2462 59.82295 49.90724 49.9073 76.64269 65.95816 52.42564 62.26746 
         
DECILE 6 57.36148 51.07165 55.02303 59.43116 78.75453 78.03669 73.91827 70.383 
         
DECILE 7 55.54834 56.3996 58.86735 51.81883 73.72482 82.0841 75.09611 65.60038 
         
DECILE 8 52.6569 57.59863 56.76366 56.68794 70.93657 73.67321 72.64594 84.48552 
         
DECILE 9 45.55809 45.62096 45.83683 46.75425 67.18287 66.20691 75.7839 70.20469 
         
DECILE 10 30.64615 28.68481 27.42734 32.26521 45.60565 37.05462 50.25639 52.94293 
(T-STATISTIC)b (1.713225988) † (0.86101012) (1.927977124) † (1.45574841) (1.565200626) (2.086609846) † (0.933931851) (1.128949326) 
 
a To be included in each test period, a security must have non-missing market capitalisation data in the post-historical returns ranking period. 
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b Statistical test performed to test the equality of size between winner and loser portfolios. 
† Significant at the 90% level  
^ With 1977 as base year. 
* £Million  
 
 
